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Recently within social cognition it has been argued that understanding others is
primarily characterized by dynamic and second person interactive processes, rather
than by taking a third person observational stance. Within this enactivist view of
intersubjective understanding, researchers differ in their claims regarding the innateness
of such processes. Here we proposed to distinguish nativist enactivists—who argue
that studies on neonatal imitation support the view that infants already have a
non-mentalistic embodied form of intersubjective understanding present at birth—from
empiricist enactivists, who claim that those intersubjective processes are learned through
social interaction. In this article, we critically examine the empirical studies on neonate
imitation and conclude that the available evidence is at least mixed for most types of
specific gesture imitations. In the end, only the tongue protrusion imitation appears
to be consistent across different studies. If neonates imitate only one single gesture,
then a more parsimonious explanation for the tongue protrusion effect could be put
forward. Consequently, the nativist enactivist claim that understanding others depends on
second person interactive processes already present at birth seems no longer plausible.
Although other strands of evidence provide converging evidence for the importance of
intersubjective processes in adult social cognition, the available evidence on neonatal
imitation calls for a more careful view on the innateness of such processes and suggests
that this way of interacting needs to be learned over time. Therefore the available empirical
evidence on neonate imitation is in our view compatible with the empiricist enactivist
position, but not with the nativist enactivist position.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Humans are social in nature. Almost everything we do involves
interacting with other human beings. An important prerequisite
for social interaction is the understanding of others 1. Take for
instance a game with three people in which person A reads a
message and has to transfer it to person B, who, after receiving
1We realize that the word “understanding” has a strong cognitivist conno-
tation, when combined with words like “intention,” but in our view the
term understanding in itself can be used by both cognitivists and enactivists
alike, because understanding can also be interpreted in a non-cognitivist
way. For instance, Gallagher and Hutto (2008) published an article titled:
“Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice.”
Carpendale and Lewis (2010) define social understanding as the “everyday
thinking necessary to engage in social interaction.” Because this definition
could imply a cognitivist reading of social understanding and we aim to
remain agnostic regarding the debate on the role of representations when it
comes to explaining social interaction, we propose to define social under-
standing as “the skills necessary to engage in social interaction.” Social
understanding from a cognitivist perspective would for instance involve skills
like havingmental representations about other people’s intentions, while from
an enactivist perspective it would for instance involve skills like an immediate
perceptual understanding arising from a social interaction in which intentions
are explicitly expressed in embodied actions Gallagher and Hutto (2008).
the message has to transfer it to person C. The difficulty in this
game, however, is that person A and C are not allowed to interact
directly and all attendants are not allowed to use spoken lan-
guage. Therefore they have to transmit the message by only using
weird sounds and gestures instead. Often the receiver of the mes-
sage imitates the gestures and sounds of the transmitter in order
to better understand the transmission. In the end, the original
message is compared to person C’s interpretation of the message
received from person B. Occasionally, person C’s interpretation
differs considerably from the original message, but surprisingly
often the interpretation lies close to the original message. This
example not only illustrates that human interaction requires us
to understand each other’s actions, but it also shows that we are
pretty good at it, even in complex situations where we cannot use
all available channels of communication. But how exactly are we
able to understand actions of other people?
Within the field of social cognition, there are two dominant
theoretical approaches that explain our ability to understand
other human beings form a cognitivist perspective. According to
Theory theory (TT), we understand others by theorizing about
their minds (Leslie, 1987; Gopnik and Wellman, 1994). On this
account, the understanding of other minds relies on taking a
theoretical stance and postulating the existence of mental states
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in others that can help us to explain their behavior. Simulation
theory (ST), on the other hand, posits—broadly speaking—that
we use our own experiences as an internal model for under-
standing others (Gordon, 1986; Goldman, 2002). We simulate
thoughts and/or feelings that we would experience if we were
in the very same situation the other person is in. TT and ST
agree about the fact that we explain and predict other’s behavior
using mental state attributions by taking a third person observa-
tional stance. Because both theories use internal representations
to explain how human beings understand others, they can be
viewed as representational theories. The nature of these repre-
sentations, however, differs between the two theories and they
therefore disagree clearly with regard to the processes that let
us understand others. TT claims that understanding others can
be accomplished by using abstract theories about other minds,
while ST claims that representations are based on sensorimotor
experiences instead and involve simulating others’ thoughts and
actions.
Recently, it has been argued that understanding others is not
primarily characterized by taking such a third person stance
involving representations of other’s actions, but instead by a sec-
ond person stance involving dynamic and interactive processes
(Zahavi, 2001; Gallagher, 2005; Gallagher and Hutto, 2008; Fuchs
and De Jaegher, 2009). This enactivist position proposes that the
environment as well as an agent’s body play an important role
in shaping our cognition. According to enactivists, cognition is
a sense making process, emerging from a dynamic interaction
between agents and the environment in which they are embedded
(de Bruin and Kästner, 2012). Enactivist theories are for instance
supported by studies on motoric development in children, show-
ing that their stepping behavior does not result from a cognitive
programme present in the child, but instead the behavior self-
organizes in a dynamic interaction between a child’s spontaneous
limb movements and a changing environment (Galloway and
Thelen, 2004; Gershkoff-Stowe and Thelen, 2004). The enactivist
proposal differs from both third person perspectives on social
cognition (Theory theory and Simulation theory) in that the
latter two use internal representations to explain our understand-
ing of others, while enactivism is strongly anti-representational
(Chemero, 2009). While this anti-representationalism is an essen-
tial characteristic of enactivism in general, enactivists still argue
about the origins of the intersubjective processes we use to
understand others. Some argue that these processes are innate
and therefore already present at birth (Gallagher, 2001, 2005;
Gallagher and Hutto, 2008; Fuchs, 2009), a position coined
nativist enactivism. Empiricist enactivists, on the other hand,
claim that these intersubjective processes are not innate, but
develop as a result of interpersonal interaction (Di Paolo and
De Jaegher, 2012; Froese et al., 2012)2.
2We realize that many enactivist positions are more nuanced than the nativist-
empiricist distinction suggests, but we still consider our distinction useful
because it provides a conceptual tool for classifying different theories in their
relative emphasis on learning or innate processes. That is, we argue that some
enactivist explain social understanding in part by innate processes, while other
enactivists deny the relevance of such processes because they claim that inter-
active or learning processes are sufficient. The distinction between nativist and
Nativist enactivism does not necessarily imply a rejection of
the empiricist notion that infants develop intersubjective under-
standing through learning. A nativist enactivist could view the
processes underlying social cognition as primarily innate, while
allowing experience to play a secondary role. Consequently, learn-
ing could still influence human cognition as a trigger of innately
determined intersubjective processes (Gallagher, 2005). A much
more stronger nativist claim would be to deny any influence of
learning on human understanding whatsoever. However, such
final state nativism (Meltzoff, 2002) is rare within enactivism,
because it is incompatible with the central enactivist tenet that
social cognition is shaped by experience in a dynamic interaction
between an agent’s body and the environment. To our knowledge,
most nativist enactivist therefore still allow learning to play a role
in shaping cognition (Zahavi, 2001; Gallagher and Hutto, 2008;
Fuchs, 2009).
The nativist enactivist view on intersubjective understand-
ing is supported by studies on intentionality detection (Meltzoff,
1995), eye direction detection (Baron-Cohen, 1997), and neona-
tal imitation (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977), suggesting that very
young infants already have a non-mentalistic and embodied
form of intersubjective understanding (Gallagher, 2008). Of those
three strands of research, the studies on neonatal imitation are
most important to the nativist enactivist view because they
could imply that a basic form of intersubjective understanding
is already present at birth and does therefore not depend on
any learning—as, for instance, assumed by empiricist enactivists.
More specifically, studies on neonatal imitation imply that a basic
form of intersubjective understanding is reflected in the infant’s
ability to automatically and dynamically respond to observed
actions, by producing a similar gesture, suggesting an impor-
tant role for an innate body schema guiding interaction with
the world (Gallagher, 2005). Recent reviews on neonatal imita-
tion literature, however, questioned the generality of neonatal
imitation and proposed alternatively more parsimonious theo-
ries to explain these findings (Anisfeld, 1991; Jones, 2009; Ray and
Heyes, 2011).
In contrast, the empiricist view on enactivism puts more
emphasis on the importance of sensorimotor and social learning
for intersubjective understanding (Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012;
Froese et al., 2012). In support of this account it is for instance
pointed out that imitation in infants is experience-dependent and
possibly mediated by the sensorimotor configuration of the so-
called mirror neuron system (MNS). Furthermore, it is argued
that rather than being equipped with an innate body schema,
empiricist enactivism therefore primarily serves an instrumental purpose in
order to illustrate the differing enactivist views on the origin of social under-
standing. A similar empiricist-nativist distinction appears to be a fruitful
way to classify other developmental debates, such as the origin of knowledge
(Spelke, 1998), language (MacWhinney, 1999), or spatial and quantitative
processing (Newcombe, 2002). We propose to use a similar distinction to clar-
ify the present debate on the origin of social understanding. Disentangling
theories based on their relative emphasis on learning or innate processes is
especially relevant for discussing the evidence of neonatal imitation. That is,
if neonatal imitation would exist, this provides strong evidence for the notion
that basic forms of social interaction are already present at birth and do not
have to be learned.
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infants gradually acquire an implicit sense of their body through
visuomotor and visuo-tactile experience (Zmyj et al., 2011).
In the present paper we investigate whether the available
empirical evidence for neonatal imitation poses a potential prob-
lem for the validity of the nativist enactivist claim that under-
standing others depends on second person interactive processes
that are already present at birth. If neonates can imitate only one
single gesture, then a more parsimonious explanation could be
put forward. Therefore, we will investigate the scope of neona-
tal imitation, because the nativist enactivist theories rely on the
generality of this phenomenon (Heyes, 2001). First, we will clar-
ify the basic concepts and theories about imitation, followed
by a short review of the classic neonate imitation experiments
by Meltzoff and Moore (1977, 1983a, 1989, 1994). After that
we will focus on some contradictory findings, followed by an
examination of two systematic reviews (Anisfeld, 1991; Ray and
Heyes, 2011). Lastly, we will wrap these findings up and consider
their implications for the enactivist approach on intersubjective
understanding.
2. IMITATION
One of the milestones in parent-child interaction is the moment a
newly born for the first time imitates the parent. Examples of such
mimicking behavior are the imitation of observed head move-
ments, facial gestures, or even rudimentary speech. Imitations
are not confined to human beings: researchers demonstrated that
birds and non-human primates are also able to imitate, even at
a neonatal age (Carpenter and Tomasello, 1995; Custance et al.,
1995, 1999; Akins and Zentall, 1996, 1998; Ferrari et al., 2006;
Myowa-Yamakoshi, 2006; Bard, 2007).
2.1. DEFINITION
A key issue within imitation debates is how genuine imitation
is defined, hence how the construct of imitation is validated in
different empirical studies. All definitions of imitation have in
common that they entail an observer copying a body (part) move-
ment of a model (Heyes, 2001). In other words, an observer
receives visual information about an observed body movement
and uses this information to perform a similar movement in
response. Note that we exclude those situations in which the
model’s movement and the imitator’s movement spontaneously
co-occur. We also exclude any act to be of imitative nature when
it is caused by something else than the model and its behavior
(Anisfeld, 1991).
Further, it is important to distinguish imitation from both
emulation (Tomasello, 1996) and spatial compatibility (Brass
et al., 2001). Emulation—like imitation—concerns a person
copying an action from a model, but the performed action is
only similar to the model’s action in terms of the goal and not
in terms of the movements that lead to that goal. For instance,
you might water the plants with a watering can, while I might
achieve the same goal by using a watering hose. In that case, the
goal of the action is the same, whereas the movements differ and
this is considered an instance of emulation rather than imitation.
Thus, a prerequisite for genuine imitation is a match between the
observed and the performed movements. Spatial compatibility—
like imitation—involves a similarity between the relative position
of the action of an imitator and amodel, but with spatial compati-
bility the action’s target is not necessarily similar. For instance, if a
person standing opposite to you asks you to raise your right hand
and he raises his own right hand at the same time, due to spatial
compatibility you will be more likely to raise your own left hand
instead. Emulation as well as imitation can also be used in order
to understand the actions of others (Takahashi et al., 2010). That
is, being able to imitate another person’s actions implies the abil-
ity to respond to the other’s movements in a way that is socially
and communicatively effective.
2.2. CURRENT DEBATES IN IMITATION RESEARCH
Within the field of imitation research, different debates regard-
ing the onset, the underlying mechanisms and automaticity of
imitation can be discerned. Although most scientists agree that
human infants are able to imitate at some age, probably an equal
number of scholars disagree about the exact age at which infants
become able to show imitation. Numerous studies indicate that
in their second year of life infants are able to imitate other peo-
ple (Piaget, 1946; Meltzoff, 1995; Carpenter et al., 1998; Nadel
and Butterworth, 1999). Yet, when it comes to imitation at a
neonatal age, the results are still contradictory (Meltzoff and
Moore, 1977, 1983a; Koepke et al., 1983; McKenzie and Over,
1983).
The second dispute concerns the underlying mechanisms of
imitation and whether these differ between neonatal and older
infants or even adults. In a way this debate mirrors also the
nature-nurture debate, because the issue is here whether imita-
tion is innate or depends on learning. If newly born infants can
imitate, then this underlines the existence of an innatemechanism
underlying imitation (e.g., an automatic coupling of observed
actions to one’s own behavioral repertoire). When neonatal imi-
tation proves not to be genuine, on the other hand, and is
not comparable to imitation seen in older infants, then this
might indicate dependency of additional learning such as learn-
ing to couple observed actions to one’s own behavioral repertoire
(Anisfeld, 1991; Gallagher, 2001, 2005; Ray and Heyes, 2011)3.
Related to this debate is the third dispute to what extent imita-
tion in adults can be viewed as automatic (Heyes, 2011). Studies
on automatic imitation in adults suggest that the mirror neuron
system (MNS) provides a direct connection between the percep-
tion of action and the production of action (Kilner et al., 2003;
Press et al., 2005; Longo et al., 2008; van Schie et al., 2008). This
involvement of the mirror neuron system (MNS) in imitation
might imply that the system has evolved as a specialized mech-
anism for our intersubjective understanding (Rizzolatti et al.,
2001; Gallese et al., 2004). On the other hand, it has been argued
that the mirror neuron system is not an innate mechanism but
relies on sensorimotor learning and accordingly develops through
experience (Ray and Heyes, 2011). Thus, a similar discussion
regarding innateness and automaticity vs. the role of experience
and learning can be observed in studies on infant imitation and
the development of the MNS.
3Some enactivists, however, do not necessarilly view two qualitatively different
forms of imitation (neonate vs. adult) as problematic (Froese and Leavens,
2014).
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2.3. FUNCTIONAL AND COGNITIVE MECHANISMS
An important functional mechanism underlying imitation con-
cerns the mapping from observed movements to one’s own body.
More specifically, this correspondence problem entails that when
imitating someone, the imitator needs to know which observed
body parts map onto his or her own body parts. In other words:
it needs to be specified how visual information is translated into a
corresponding motor act. If you see someone move their hand
then you need to know that their hand looks similar to your
own hand and that you are able to perform the same movement
with your hand. This process becomes much more complicated
when it involves the observation of body parts that are difficult
to observe on your body, such as for instance your tongue. In
order to solve the correspondence problem, cognitivist theories
propose that infants imitate an observed movement by using an
internal representation of the observed body part. Infants then
associate this observation with a motor act by mentally match-
ing this representation with proprioceptive information of their
own body parts (Schaal, 1999; Heyes, 2002; Spaulding, 2010).
Enactivist theories, on the other hand, propose that cognitive
internal representations are not required to explain imitation.
Enactivists propose that we understand other people primarily
by directly responding to other people’s behavior in a dynamic
interaction between the environment and our own perceptual
experiences.
Within enactivism, two different explanations of imitation can
be distinguished. First, nativist enactivists claim that an innate
body schema enables children to directly map observed move-
ments (e.g., facial gestures) on their own movement repertoire.
A body schema is defined as a system of sensorimotor processes
that constantly regulates posture and movement—processes that
function without reflective awareness or the necessity of per-
ceptual monitoring (Gallagher, 2005). Such an innate body
schema is biologically based and already present in the pre-natal
stage (i.e., in the womb), where the child can already explore
his own body through touch and proprioception (Butterworth,
1992; Gallagher, 2008). Nativist enactivist theorists claim that we
understand other people primarily because of our innate capa-
bility to directly respond to other people’s behavior involving a
dynamic interaction between the environment and our own per-
ceptual experiences and body schema (Gallagher, 2008). Support
for the innateness of this process relies heavily on experimen-
tal studies showing that neonates already have a basic form of
intersubjective understanding. If neonates have the capacity to
dynamically interact with the environment by directly matching
their proprioceptive experience with other people’s behavior, then
the basic mechanisms that adults use to understand others are
already present at birth and do therefore not need to be learned.
According to one nativist enactivist, the “studies on newborn imi-
tation suggest that there is at least a primitive body schema from
the very beginning. This would be a schema sufficiently devel-
oped at birth to account for the ability to move one’s body in
appropriate ways in response to environmental, and especially
interpersonal, stimuli” (Gallagher, 2005). Similarly, according to
Gallagher and Meltzoff (1996) the evidence on neonate imita-
tion “suggests that there exists an innate system that accounts for
the possibilities of early infant imitation.” This line of reasoning
indicates clearly that studies on neonatal imitation are of high
importance to the nativist enactivist claim.
Nativist enactivists often refer to one particular set of stud-
ies on neonate imitation published by Meltzoff and colleagues
(Meltzoff and Moore, 1977, 1983a, 1989, 1994). They use these
studies to support the notion that the basic intersubjective mech-
anisms underlying adult social cognition are already present in
neonatal infants. For instance, according to Fuchs (2009), the
studies by Meltzoff and Moore show “that the capacity of imita-
tion in human infants is essential for understanding others. From
birth on, infants possess interpersonal body schemas for sponta-
neous facial imitation and emotional resonance. They experience
the other’s body as similar to their own, and thus, they also trans-
pose the seen facial expressions and gestures of others into their
own feelings. These schemas underlie the development of more
sophisticated empathic abilities in the course of early interac-
tions.” In a similar vein, Gallagher and Hutto (2008) claim that
the Meltzoff and Moore studies imply that “an intermodal tie
between a proprioceptive sense of one’s body and the face that one
sees is already functioning at birth.” In other words, these studies
“confirm the existence of an innate body representation,” allow-
ing infants to “imitate some simple movements like protrusion of
tongue” (De Vignemont, 2003).
The neonate imitation studies underlining the nativist enac-
tivist claim (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977, 1983a, 1989, 1994) are,
however, only a selective sample of all the studies conducted
using the imitation paradigm; most other studies show at least
contradictory results regarding the capability of genuine imita-
tion in neonates. To our knowledge, most nativist enactivists
do not refer to these contradictory findings (Gallagher, 2000,
2001, 2005, 2008, 2011; Zahavi, 2001; Gallagher and Hutto, 2008;
Fuchs, 2009). Furthermore, the nativist enactivist’s claim that
neonates already have a basic form of intersubjective understand-
ing relies heavily on experiments showing that neonates cannot
only imitate one specific gesture but that they can imitate differ-
ent kinds of social gestures. This generality of neonatal imitation
is important to nativist enactivists: if imitation is an innate mech-
anism used for intersubjective understanding, then one would
expect that this imitative mechanism is not limited to only one
specific type of gesture. Reacting to only one specific gesture
would probably indicate that neonates do not understand action
in social situations but only imitate one particular gesture as a
result of other, more unspecific biological, reflex-like, or learned
mechanisms (Anisfeld, 1991, 1996; Heyes, 2001; Di Paolo and
De Jaegher, 2012). As a consequence the nativist enactivist claim
regarding the innateness and automaticity of imitation and action
understanding would no longer be valid.
Empiricist enactivists, on the other hand, claim that the pro-
cesses underlying imitation are dynamically learned during social
interaction (Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012; Froese et al., 2012;
Froese and Leavens, 2014). These views are substantiated by
studies showing that the mirror system is continuously shaped
through sensorimotor learning and therefore highly adaptive.
This high plasticity of the mirror system enables the mechanisms
underlying imitation to be constantly adjusted during interper-
sonal interaction (Catmur et al., 2007, 2009). We consider the
distinction between nativist- and empiricist enactivism to be
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important, because it highlights the opposing views within enac-
tivism regarding the origins of intersubjective understanding in
humans. The studies on neonate imitation are important within
this debate, because they are used to support the nativist enac-
tivist view that those intersubjective processes are already present
at birth. Although most empiricist enactivists are well aware of
the conflicting evidence on neonate imitation (Di Paolo and
De Jaegher, 2012; Froese et al., 2012; Froese and Leavens, 2014),
some nativist enactivists clearly use the studies on neonate imita-
tion as if they are an indisputable phenomenon (Gallagher, 2005;
Gallagher andHutto, 2008; Fuchs, 2009). Therefore, in the follow-
ing paragraphs we will critically examine the studies on neonate
imitation and consider the implications of these studies for both
the nativist- and empiricist enactivist view on intersubjective
understanding.
3. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON NEONATAL IMITATION
Studies on neonatal imitation are important within the imitation
debate because they could imply that a basic form of intersubjec-
tive understanding is already present at birth and does therefore
not need to be learned. The phenomenon of neonate imitation
was already widely reported in the pre-experimental literature
(Stern and Barwell, 1924; McDougall, 1926; Piaget, 1946), but the
novelty of the Meltzoff and Moore (1977) studies was that they
were the first to investigate neonate imitation in an experimental
and systematic fashion, by studying infants in a hospital lab.
3.1. MELTZOFF AND MOORE’S SEMINAL STUDIES
In one experiment, Meltzoff and Moore (1977) asked a model to
present three different facial gestures to 12–17 days old infants.
The model first presented each infant for 90 s with a neutral and
passive face, which served as a baseline measure with which the
imitation effect would be compared. Subsequently, the model
showed the infants four times in a 15 s period randomly one of the
three facial gestures (tongue protrusion, mouth opening, or lip
protrusion). This was followed by a 20 s period during which the
infants were allowed to respond. For all infants, responses to the
model’s gestures were videotaped. Afterwards and for each trial,
six independent graduate students who were blind to the model’s
specific gestures, watched the video and ranked the facial gestures
from beingmost to least likely imitated by the infant. For instance,
a possible ranking of imitative responses for a modeled tongue
protrusion could be (1) tongue protrusion; (2) mouth opening;
(3) lip protrusion. It turned out that for each modeled gesture
infants were significantly more likely to perform specifically that
gesture, compared to no gesture or other gestures. This finding
conforms the definition that imitation involves a non-random
copy of an observed body (part) movement of a model caused
by nothing else than the mere observation of the model itself.
One limitation of this study, however, is that the researchers
did not exclude the possibility of an experimenter bias. That is,
during the experiment, neonates were often not paying atten-
tion to the model, because they were spitting or choking. To
overcome this problem, the model sometimes repeated the facial
gesture to make sure the gestured was attended by the neonate.
Consequently, this solution might have led the model to repeat
the gesture until a neonatal reaction randomly coincided with
the model’s demonstrated gesture. To overcome this consider-
able problem, Meltzoff and Moore designed another experiment
(Meltzoff and Moore, 1983a) in which they used a fixed dura-
tion for each presented gesture. Neonates in this experiment were
even younger than those in the previous experiment: their ages
ranged from 42min to 71 h. Again, neonates imitated the model’s
tongue protrusion andmouth openings consistently. The effect of
lip protrusion on imitation, however, failed this time to reach the
required level of statistical significance.
An alternative account of this neonate imitation effect
entails an innate and evolutionary relatively old release mech-
anism involved in promoting the neonate’s chances of survival
(Jacobson, 1979; Bjorklund, 1987). Mouth openings and tongue
protrusions, could for instance just be a reflex toward a suck-
able object, such as a mother’s nipple. Consequently, neonate
responses in the gesture imitation paradigm could thus be caused
by their mere perception of the model’s tongue as a suckable
object, independent of any genuine imitation. According to the
innate release mechanism account, the observed link between
a model’s tongue protrusion and the neonate’s tongue protru-
sion could be merely coincidental and uninformative regarding
genuine imitation.
However, Meltzoff and Moore (1994) propose that if this
innate release mechanism plays a role in neonate imitation, then
the neonate’s response to a suckable stimulus should occur shortly
after the perception of that stimulus and not after a delay. To
rule out the innate release account, they conducted an exper-
iment similar to their previous experiments, but now with an
additional condition in which the neonate’s response was delayed
by 24 h: the model randomly demonstrated a gesture and after
24 h, the neonates saw the same model again, but now only with
a passive face. First, Meltzoff and Moore replicated their previous
findings that neonates systematically imitated the model’s tongue
protrusion and mouth openings if they were allowed to respond
directly after the model presented the gesture. Furthermore, after
the 24 h delay, neonates showed significantly more tongue protru-
sions than other gestures, if the model had demonstrated a tongue
protrusion 24 earlier. Interestingly, this effect was not found for
other gestures. This finding is interpreted as reflecting a specific
effect of imitation, in which the observed action is imitated after
a delay and can therefore not be explained by being a reflex due
to an innate release mechanism4.
Several other studies found results very similar to those
of Meltzoff and Moore (Jacobson, 1979; Field et al., 1983;
Meltzoff and Moore, 1983b; Fontaine, 1984; Kugiumutzakis,
1985; Abravanel and DeYong, 1991), but an even more extensive
number of studies failed to replicate these initial neonate imita-
tion effects (Anisfeld et al., 1979; Hayes andWatson, 1981; Koepke
et al., 1983; McKenzie and Over, 1983; Neuberger et al., 1983;
Abravanel and Sigafoos, 1984; Fontaine, 1984; Lewis and Sullivan,
1985; Heimann et al., 1989). To clarify and explain these mixed
4This experiment by itself does in our view not provide evidence for the
nativist enactivist claim that neonates are capable of intersubjective under-
standing, for all the dynamics between actor and observer are lost after
the introduction of a delay between the modeled gesture and the neonate’s
response.
www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 967 | 5
Lodder et al. Enactivism and neonatal imitation
results, several reviews on neonatal imitation have been published
that will be discussed in the next section.
3.2. REVIEWS OF NEONATAL IMITATION
One review analyzed 26 experiments on neonatal imitation
that together combined 15 different gestures in a total num-
ber of 76 gesture conditions (Anisfeld, 1996). Tongue protrusion
and mouth opening were the most commonly studied gestures,
accounting for 23 and 16 gesture conditions, respectively. Anisfeld
counted for each experiment whether or not an effect was found
in a particular gesture condition. He defined an effect as present
when the neonates showed significantly more correct imitations
in the gesture condition than in the neutral comparison condi-
tion. Finally, he required an effect to be significant on a two tailed
test, with a p-value smaller than 0.05.
In total, an effect was present in 28 of the 76 gesture condi-
tions (37%). It turned out that an effect was present in 12 of
the 23 tongue protrusion conditions (52%), 3 of the 16 mouth
opening conditions (19%), and 13 of the 37 remaining gesture
conditions (35%). Tongue protrusion appears thus to be stronger
than the other gesture effects in this review. However, still 48%
of the tongue protrusion conditions did not show an effect at all.
For all 11 tongue protrusion conditions that did not have a signif-
icant effect, the duration of the gesture demonstration turned out
to be less than 40 s. Conversely, conditions in which the tongue
protrusions were demonstrated for more than 60 s all did show
a significant effect. Anisfeld (1991) concludes therefore that a
neonate imitation effect is present only for the tongue protrusion
gesture and only under conditions of longer gesture presentation.
Based on the review, Anisfeld (1996) argues further that if
neonate imitation would have been a general phenomenon, then
neonates that showed a strong tongue protrusion effect should
also more strongly imitate other studied facial gestures. In other
words, if genuine neonate imitation is present, then a positive
correlation should show up between different gesture imitations.
This was, however, not the case for the 76 reviewed gesture
conditions (Anisfeld, 1996).
Anisfeld investigated additionally also the frequency of tongue
protrusions and mouth openings per minute after modeled
tongue protrusions, mouth openings, or passive faces. He found
that the frequency of neonatal tongue protrusions was signif-
icantly higher after a modeled tongue protrusion than after
modeled mouth openings or passive faces. This effect was not
found for the mouth openings: the frequency of mouth opening
responses did not significantly differ when either tongue protru-
sions, mouth openings or passive faces were modeled. This does
not necessarily mean however that no genuine imitation ofmouth
openings was present. It could also mean that statistical power
was simply too low. That is, Anisfeld analyzed a total of 12 mouth
opening studies. The power to find a medium effect (d = 0.50),
given an alpha of 0.05 and a sample size of 12, equals 0.35, which
is quite low indeed (Cohen, 1977).
Furthermore, because Anisfeld used data from different stud-
ies in his two-sided t-test, the observations of the neonates are
nested within the different studies, making it likely that specific
study characteristics influence the neonate imitation effects exces-
sively (Hox, 2002). In his analysis, Anisfeld also made use of
aggregated data by looking at the mean frequencies of neonatal
gesture responses, thereby ignoring individual variation in ges-
ture responses. In fact, even more variation is ignored because
the data actually conforms to a multilevel structure with four
levels: gestures nested within neonates, nested within experi-
ments, nested within studies. When amultilevel analysis had been
adopted instead, then this unsystematic variation would have
been addressed more appropriately. By not taking this variation
into account, chances of making a type I error are dramatically
increased (Stevens, 2009; Hox, 2010), which makes it also more
likely that the tongue protrusion imitation is over-estimated or
even is itself a false positive.
These latter statistical considerations make it difficult to con-
clude clearly about the presence or absence of neonatal imitation
based on the analysis of the tongue protrusion and mouth open-
ing frequencies. This leaves us then with Anisfeld’s counts of
the significant gesture effects showing significance for only 52%
(12/23) of the tongue protrusion conditions and 37% (28/76) of
the gesture conditions in general. However, this analysis simplifies
and reduces quantitative information by dichotomizing the data
into either an effect or no effect. The strength of an effect or the
amplitude is thereby completely ignored, as well as the variation
of the data within each separate study. Therefore, we cannot draw
any strong conclusions about the strength of the genuine neonate
imitation effects for each gesture. This would only be possible if
we conduct a meta-analysis, but most of the reviewed studies did
not even report standard deviations, which makes it impossible
to conduct a proper meta-analysis in the first place (Tabachnick
et al., 2001)5.
A more recent review corroborates the findings of Anisfeld
(1996). Ray andHeyes (2011) reviewed 37 experiments on neona-
tal imitation, comprising a total of 17 different gestures. It turned
out that eight of those gestures did not provide support for the
existence of genuine neonatal imitation. Eight of the remaining
nine gestures showed mixed results, but the authors explained
these findings either as peculiar scoring criteria, or by being a
side-effect of the tongue protrusion gesture. Peculiar scoring cri-
teria include for instance the categorization of each imitation as
either present or absent, rather than calculating response frequen-
cies. Furthermore, gestures that include mouth movements such
as mouth openings can be viewed as a side-effect of an imitated
tongue protrusion. Despite these limitations, but in line with the
results of Anisfeld (1996), the only gesture that did reliably show
positive results was the tongue protrusion (Ray and Heyes, 2011).
Because the reviews described in this paper lack proper meta-
analytic techniques, a compelling meta-analysis seems to be
required to settle the question whether neonatal imitation really
exists. Additionally, one venue for further empirical exploration
of this matter could be to find out which factors may moderate
the neonate imitation effects (e.g., differences in parental style and
personality characteristics, attractiveness of the experimenter’s
face, delay that is used in the experiment etc.). Moderating factors
might explain the huge discrepancy in the experimental findings
that have been reported thus far. A proper meta-analysis will not
only overcome the statistical problems of the systematic review by
5Such a meta-analysis, however, was beyond the scope of the present paper.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 967 | 6
Lodder et al. Enactivism and neonatal imitation
Anisfeld (1996), but it can also be used as a tool to discover factors
moderating the neonate imitation effects.
4. DISCUSSION
The studies reviewed above indicate that there is no convincing
evidence for the existence of neonatal imitation of different social
gestures. Both reviews conclude that only the tongue protrusion
gesture shows a reliable imitation effect (Anisfeld, 1991; Ray and
Heyes, 2011). However, these reviews suffer from a number of
statistical flaws that make it difficult to interpret their results deci-
sively in this matter. Leaving this aside, the Anisfeld (1991) review
points out that 63% of the investigated imitation conditions failed
to show any effect, which indicates at least that the available evi-
dence does not favor neonatal imitation in general. And although
the strongest imitation effect appears to be found with tongue
protrusion gestures, still 48% of those experiments fail to find
an effect. Thus, it can be concluded that neonate imitation is far
from a well-established scientific phenomenon. It seems mislead-
ing therefore to present genuine neonate imitation as a robust
finding (as for instance in Gallagher, 2005, and see Gallagher,
2000, 2001, 2005, 2008, 2011; Zahavi, 2001; Gallagher and Hutto,
2008; Fuchs, 2009; Varga and Gallagher, 2012).
4.1. ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON
NEONATAL IMITATION
If neonates are really capable of genuine imitation, then nativist
enactivists need to explain why the experimental evidence is so
contradictory and why it seems to indicate that genuine neonate
imitation—if it exists at all—is only restricted to tongue protru-
sions. If neonate imitation is not a general phenomenon, then it
is more parsimonious to explain tongue protrusions, for instance,
by an underlying innate release mechanism (Anisfeld, 1996).
According to this interpretation, a modeled tongue protrusion
resembles an approaching nipple, thereby triggering an innate
sucking reflex in the neonate. This interpretation cannot explain,
however, the finding of delayed tongue protrusions observed in
one of Meltzoff and Moore’s experiments (Meltzoff and Moore,
1994), because the innate release mechanism requires the reflex
to happen directly after the observed tongue protrusion.
An even more parsimonious explanation that also does
not contradict Meltzoff and Moore’s delayed response finding
(Meltzoff and Moore, 1994), proposes that tongue protrusions
reflect a tendency to explore the world (Jones, 2009). One study
showed, for instance, that neonates do not only stick out their
tongue in reaction to a tongue or nipple-like objects, but also to a
human face or inanimate objects such as bright lights or music
(Jones, 1996a). Consequently, this theory explains the delayed
tongue protrusion as oral exploratory behavior in reaction to
non-specific visual stimuli – in this case the mere perception of
the person who modeled the tongue protrusion 1 day earlier. This
implies that to a neonate, modeled tongue protrusions are just a
specific example of a wide range of stimuli that can arouse the
neonate’s interest to explore the world. Additionally, a longitudi-
nal study indicates that tongue protrusions decrease as soon as
infants become able to grasp objects (Jones, 1996b). Therefore,
according to Jones, the tongue protrusion effect can be more par-
simoniously explained as an innate reflex that enables neonates
to start exploring the world until other modes of exploration
become possible. The finding that tongue protrusions are not only
directed at humans but also at inanimate objects like bright lights,
suggests that tongue protrusions do not necessarily have a com-
municative or social function. However, if the tongue protrusions
directed at humans are of a different kind than those directed at
inanimate objects, then a social function might still be possible
alongside the gesture’s explorative features as proposed by Jones
(2009).
Both alternative explanations described above propose that
neonate imitation is caused by an innate, reflex-like mecha-
nism and does not reflect genuine imitation as defined before.
Although both explanations can explain the origin of the
tongue protrusion imitation in neonates, they cannot account
for instances of infant or adult imitation that are more complex,
such as intentional imitation. This naturally raises the question of
how and by what mechanisms human beings are able to develop
the capacity to imitate. Recently, a new model has been pro-
posed that explains imitation as a process that is learned through
sensorimotor experience, rather than a purely innate biological
mechanism (Heyes and Ray, 2000; Ray and Heyes, 2011). This
associative sequence learning (ASL) model claims that associations
between motor representations and sensory representations of
an action are formed through experience via associative learning
(Schultz and Dickinson, 2000). These associations can be formed
not only through direct self-observation, but also by observing
oneself through a mirror or by observing someone else imitating
your actions. In this way, the ASL model is able to explain how
infants learn to imitate—even the imitation of actions that can-
not be directly observed by the actor, such as for instance facial
expressions.
Various studies support this notion that genuine imitation is
acquired through learning rather than being innate. First, evi-
dence from neuroimaging studies indicates that sensorimotor
experiences can influence the mirror neuron system (Calvo-
Merino et al., 2005, 2006). For instance, people who are expert
dancers show more activity in their mirror neuron system when
observing other people perform “their” dance, than when they
observe a dance they do not master. This difference in mirror
neuron system activity might imply that sensorimotor learning
influences the development of the mirror neuron system. This
connection between action experience and action observation is
also found in young children. Sommerville et al. (2005) showed
that a short experience with using a mitten to reach to dis-
tant objects, changes the infant perception of other goal directed
actions, suggesting an important role for action experience on
action observation. In support of this view, when babies perceived
actions of others, they showed higher motor resonance for actions
that were already present in their motor repertoire (e.g., crawl-
ing), compared to actions were not yet present in their repertoire
(e.g., walking) (van Elk et al., 2008). Other studies also highlight
the importance of visuo-motor experience and associative learn-
ing for the imitation of observed actions (for review, see Heyes,
2011).
If imitation is mediated by the mirror neuron system, then it
might be possible to adjust imitative effects through sensorimo-
tor learning. This is exactly what Heyes and colleagues tested in
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several experiments (Heyes et al., 2005; Catmur et al., 2008). They
showed that humans make faster imitative gestures than compa-
rable non-imitative gestures—an effect believed to be mediated
by the mirror neuron system. However, they were able to change
this advantage of imitative over non-imitative gestures through
a sensorimotor training. In this training people were instructed
to execute a particular action while observing a different action,
thereby weakening existing imitative responses through inter-
ference. The finding that sensorimotor experience can cancel
or even reverse automatic imitation was recently also corrobo-
rated by several other studies (Catmur et al., 2007; Press et al.,
2007; Gillmeister et al., 2008), underlining the learned nature of
imitative processes.
Although the ASL model can explain how infants learn to
imitate through sensorimotor experience, the model lacks an
explanation for the tongue protrusions found in neonates within
1 day after birth. Neonates that have only been born for a few
hours lack the observational and action experience necessary
for any imitative learning. Therefore, we propose to view such
neonatal tongue protrusions—in line with Jones (2009)—not as
genuine imitation, but as an innate tendency to explore the world
instead. The ASL model can then still be used to explain the later
development of genuine imitation in infants as being caused by
sensorimotor experience6.
4.2. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ENACTIVIST THEORY OF
INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING
Based on the studies reviewed in this paper, we conclude there is
no strong evidence for innate and genuine neonate imitation. In
fact, imitation may be learned and shaped through sensorimotor
experience rather than being automatic and innate. A neonate’s
tongue protrusion can be explained as an innate tendency to
explore the world, rather than being genuine imitation (Jones,
2009). This explanation, however, does not necessarily contradict
the enactivist proposal that such tongue protrusions have a com-
municative or social function. Even if tongue protrusions turn out
to be an a innate reflex, then this could still be a reflex that evolved
biologically with a social function, because such neonatal gestures
might stimulate the neonate’s bonding with its parents, who likely
adore such gestures.
If we assume that genuine imitation is learned through sen-
sorimotor experience rather than being innate, then what are
6One shortcoming of all explanations described above, however, is that they
all focus on individuals as units of analysis. This “methodological individ-
ualism” (Boden, 2006) is not only dominant in imitation research, but also
in most areas of social neuroscience. Recently, a new model has been pro-
posed (Froese et al., 2012) that explains imitation not only in terms of the
individuals involved in the imitation, but takes the social interaction itself as
a unit of analysis. This theory actually bypasses the nativist-enactivist discus-
sion, because instead of using individual mechanisms (innate vs. learned), it
explains imitation as emerging completely from the social interaction itself.
Although this theory has been supported experimentally (Froese et al., 2012),
it is not yet complemented by brain imaging studies because of the challenges
associated with second-person perspective neuroscience. A potential venue of
future research would therefore be to study the social interaction underlying
imitation by using promising new second-person perspective techniques such
as dual EEG (Dumas et al., 2010; Naeem et al., 2012).
the implications for the enactivist theory in general and for the
way it explains our intersubjective understanding? One implica-
tion would be that nativist enactivists are not warranted to claim
that neonatal imitation supports the existence of intersubjective
understanding in neonates. However, they could still use other
studies to support the existence of infant intersubjectivity. For
instance, Baron-Cohen (1997) describes two mechanisms that
point to a basic intersubjective understanding in young infants.
First, the eye-direction detector allows infants to recognize where
other persons are looking and understand that a person is actu-
ally seeing something. Second, an intentionality detector allows
infants to interpret bodily movement as goal-directed and inten-
tional. One study showed that 18-month-old children could
understand what another person intends to do and even finish the
behavior if the observed person did not complete it (Baldwin and
Baird, 2001). Other evidence on infant intersubjectivity shows
that infants between 2 and 5 days old have a preference for looking
at human faces (Farroni et al., 2002). Furthermore, 2–3 month
old infants show awareness of their mother’s emotional behav-
ior by responding reciprocally (Murray and Trevarthen, 1985,
1986). The evidence described above, however, is based on stud-
ies that tested infants older than the ones used in the neonatal
imitation experiments. Because of this time gap, infants already
could have experienced interactions with other humans for at
least a few days. Therefore one could argue that those findings can
alternatively (and more parsimoniously) be explained as resulting
from learning through social interaction. Because infants were
not tested directly after birth, these findings cannot support an
innate view as strongly as neonate imitation studies would do.
In neonate imitation studies, neonates are sometimes observed
within minutes after birth, which precludes the possibility of hav-
ing experience with imitation. Therefore, if one wants to claim
that innate processes are causally powerful then the studies used
to support that claim will have to rule out that those processes are
carved through learning.
The absence of neonate imitation evidence makes it more diffi-
cult for nativist enactivists to describe intersubjective understand-
ing as an innate mechanism. It could still be the case, however,
that these processes are present at birth, but then the nativist enac-
tivist who uses neonate imitation studies will have to come up
with new empirical evidence instead to support the claim that our
basic intersubjective mechanisms are innate. Innateness, however,
is not a necessary component of the enactivist theory in gen-
eral. Empiricist enactivism, which proposes that the embodied
processes underlying intersubjective understanding are learned
rather than innate, is therefore not affected by the invalidity of
neonate imitation. Nativist enactivists use the body schema as a
mechanism to explain imitation and our understanding of oth-
ers (Zahavi, 2001; Gallagher, 2005). The validity of that proposal
is not necessarily threatened if genuine neonate imitation does
not exist. We propose that mechanisms like the body schema and
processes like imitation and social understanding are not innate,
but need to be learned over time. The implication for enac-
tivism would be that rather than being innate, the body schema is
acquired through a process of exploration, sensorimotor experi-
ences and learning from social interaction. Therefore, we claim
that the available experimental evidence on neonate imitation
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only undermines the nativist enactivist view on intersubjective
understanding, while the evidence does not contradict the empiri-
cist enactivist views (Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012; Froese et al.,
2012).
5. CONCLUSION
Altogether, the generality of genuine neonatal imitation is not
supported convincingly by the available experimental evidence
at this moment. Despite the findings of the tongue protrusion
imitation, it cannot be concluded that neonate imitation is a
general phenomenon. This conclusion provides a potential prob-
lem for the nativist enactivist proposal that neonates already
have a basic and innate form of intersubjective understanding at
birth. It would be important to address the contradictory find-
ings in future theories regarding the innateness of social cognition
and enactive understanding and to consider more parsimonious
explanations of the tongue protrusion effect. Nonetheless, the
outcome of the neonatal imitation debate does not pose a threat
to enactivism in general, because other strands of evidence pro-
vide converging evidence for the importance of intersubjective
processes in adult social cognition. The available evidence on
neonatal imitation, however, calls for a more careful view on
the innateness of such processes and suggests that this way of
interacting needs to be learned over time.
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